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Abstract
This paper develops a simple mercantilism model for a small open econ-
omy and examines the real e¤ects of macroeconomic policies. In this setting,
the saddle-point stability of the model with wealth e¤ects hinges on an in-
teresting "relative smoothness condition" for foreign asset accumulation. And
comparative static analysis shows that an increase of monetary growth rate
and a central-bank purchase of foreign exchange have positive real e¤ects on
the economy. In contrast, an increase of government expenditure always has
negative e¤ects on the economy. Moreover, the stronger of the mercantilist
sentiments, the more consumption, real money balance holdings and foreign
asset accumulation in the long run. These conclusions are very di¤erent from
those ridiculous ones of Obstfelds paper (1981).
Keywords: Mercantilism, Foreign Asset Accumulation, Relative Smoothness
Condition.
JEL Classication Numbers: E58, E63, F52, F41.
1 Introduction
Mercantilism is an economic theory that dominated Western European economic policies from
the 16th to the late-18th century. Mercantilist ideas holds that the prosperity of a nation is
dependent upon its supply of economic assets (or capital), which are represented by bullion (gold,
silver and trade value) held by the state. And it tells that the global volume of international trade
is "unchangeable" and a positive balance of trade with other nations (exports minus imports) is
the only way to increase the wealth of a nation. At the same time, the theory has strong policy
implications that the ruling government should advance these goals by playing a protectionist
role in the economy by encouraging exports and discouraging imports, notably through the use
of subsidies and tari¤s respectively. Therefore, it is very interesting and meanful to reexamine its
historical developments and realistic implications and construct models to investigate its e¤ects
mathematically.
Historically, a number of scholars like Hume, Dudley North, and John Locke found important
aws with mercantilism. But Adam Smith and David Hume are considered to be the founding
fathers of anti-mercantilist thought. Hume famously noted the impossibility of the mercantilists
goal of a constant positive balance of trade. 1 But based on our point of view, it is highly
probable that Hume neglected an important process of inherent economic growth of the nations
with Mercantilist ideas. It is obvious that accumulated assets (or money) can be transformed into
all sorts of production factors, such as physical (and human) capital, raw material, vehicles and
new technology, etc. That is to say, the nation with mercantilist ideas can expand production
scale, invest in new technology and purchase more raw materials from other nations. Then,
product scale will be enlarged and production cost will be decreased and product e¢ ciency will
be improved. Thus, it must be better economic growth which embodies more income (or wealth)
and consumption in the long run. Just like Reynolds (2000) lists major tenets of mercantilism:
"      import raw material, export nished good; low wages, large population, educated workers,
increased productivity, mobility of inputs domestically      ".
It is well known that Adam Smith rejected the mercantilist focus on production, arguing that
consumption was the only way to grow an economy. In his 1776 book, Wealth of Nations, Adam
Smith rst laid out the theory that mercantilism hurts the economy of the country practicing it
1The logic of Humes argument is as follows. As bullion owed into one country, the supply would increase
and the value of bullion in that state would steadily decline relative to other goods. Conversely, in the state
exporting bullion, its value would slowly rise. Eventually it would no longer be cost-e¤ective to export goods from
the high-price country, and the balance of trade would reverse itself. Hence, Hume drew the conclusion that it is
not necessary that the nation with more money supply will be richer.
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because it hurts consumers in order to benet producers. He correctly wrote:
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer
ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.
The maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in
the mercantile system the interest of the consumer is almost constantly sacriced to that of the
producer; and it seems to consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and
object of all industry and commerce. (iv.8.49)
But Smith missed an important fact. The mercantilist country only misses out on consump-
tion for a while and the victim country only gets increased consumption for a while. Eventually
the growth of industry and income in the mercantilist country and the loss of industry and
income in the victim country reverses the tide. 2
In spite of Adam Smiths repudiation of mercantilism, prominent gures continued to favor
it: in the U.S., the likes of Alexander Hamilton, Henry Clay, Henry Charles Carey, and Abaham
Lincon; and in Britain Thomas Malthus. Especially, Keynes argued that encouraging production
was just as important as consumption and also noted that in the early modern period the focus
on the bullion supplies was reasonable. In an era before paper money, and increase for bullion was
one of the few ways to increase the money supply. Furthermore, Keynes and other economists
of the period also realized the balance of payments is an important concern. Since the 1930s,
all nations have closely monitored the inow and outow of capital, and most economists agree
that a favorable balance of trade is desirable. Keynes also supported government intervention in
the economy as necessity, as did mercantilism. In his 1936 book, John Maynard Keynes updated
Smiths mercantilism theory, pointing out:
(A) favorable (trade) balance, provided it is not too large, will prove extremely stimulating;
whilst an unfavorable balance may soon produce a state of persistent depression. (p. 338)
The similarties between Keynesianism, and its successor ideas, with mercantilism have some-
times led critics to call them neo-mercantilism. Indeed, Paul Samuelson (1964), writing within
a Keynesian framework, defended mercantilism, writing:
"With employment less than full and Net National Product suboptimal, all the debunked
mercantilism arguments turns out to be valid. Tari¤s can then reduce unemployment, can add
to the NNP, and increase the total of real wages earned".
2 In a Viner model of mercantilism, Zou (1997) tells that mercantilism can succeed on its own terms for a small
economy because accumulating foreign assets (running a trade surplus) leads to long term positive outcomes. And
a nation with strong mercantilist sentiment ends up with large foreign asset accumulation and high consumption
in the long run.
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Some other systems that do copy several mercantilist policies, such as Japans economic
system, are also sometimes called neo-mercantilist. In an essay appearing in the 14 May 2007
issue of Newsweek, business columnist Robert J. Samuelson argued that China was pursuing
an essentially mercantilist trade policy that threatened to undermine the post-World War 2
international economic structure. As of 2010, the word "mercantilism" remains a pejorative
term, often used to attack various forms of protectionism. Especially, Krugman (2009) talked
about the negative e¤ect on the world economy of Chinas mercantilist policies when the worlds
major economies were in a liquidity trap. He wrote as follows:
we know that China is pursuing a mercantilist policy: keeping the renminbi weak through a
combination of capital controls and intervation, leading to trade surpluses and capital exports in
a country that might well be a natural capital importer. We also know, or should know, that this
amounts to a beggar-thy-neighbor policy or, more accurately, a beggar-everyone but yourself
policy when the worlds major economies are in a liquidity trap.     You can think of this
as a negative shock to rest-of-world net exports. In turn, this negative shock is like a negative
shock to government purchases of goods and services. So it should have a similar multiplier.
Multiplier estimates are all over the place, but tend to cluster around 1.5. So we are looking
at a negative impact on gross world product of around 1.4 persent. Not huge China isnt the
principal obstacle to recovery but signicant.
It is hard to nd another theory which was studied by researches and utilized by policy makers
constantly like mercantilism. But few mercantilism models have been developed in the literature.
To our best knowledge, Zou (1997) developed a formal mercantilism model in a framework of
modern theory of international nance. It is shown that, in the Viner model of mercantilism,
a nation with strong mercantilist sentiment ends up with large foreign asset accumulation and
high consumption in the long run; an import tari¤ leads to more foreign asset holding and more
total consumption; and the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler e¤ect exists unambiguously. Di¤erent
from Zou (1997), this paper introduces money into the private utility function and government
expenditure and foreign reserves into the government behavior, in order to examine the e¤ects of
monetary policy, government expenditure policy and foreign exchange intervention. And there
exits only one good and then ignores the discussion on the e¤ects of imports tari¤. The reason
for this modelling stratigy is that we think that the most important thing for mercantilist is
(assets) accumulation and how to protect this accumulation. And we want to compare our
results with the well-known paper by Obstfeld (1981). In an often-cited paper, Obstfeld (1981)
presents three interesting results regarding the e¤ects of government policies on foreign asset
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holding: (1) foreign exchange intervation is found to have no real e¤ects when o¢ cial foreign
reserves earn interest that is distributed to the public; (2) ination leads to higher long-run
consumption and foreigh claims; (3) an increase in government consumption induces a surplus
account in the short run and larger foreign asset accumulaton in the long run. Moreover, the
intertemporal optimization framework used by Obstfeld in this study and some related studies
(Obstfeld, 1982, 1990) have also inuenced the open economy macroeconomics in the past three
decades.
In this paper, we utilize the basic framework of Obstfeld (1981) with the usual assump-
tion of a constant discount rateand examine the e¤ects of macroeconomic policies on long-run
consumption and foreign asset accumulation in a small open economy. However, we introduce
foreign asset holdings into utility, which called the mercantilist sentiments (or wealth e¤ect).
It is shown that the policy implications of Obstfelds model hinge on the special assumption
of Uzawas (1968) time preference and they are totally reversed and substantially changed in a
dynamic optimization model with the wealth e¤ect. The wealth e¤ect approach developed in
our paper is adapted from the models of Bardhan (1967), Kurz (1968), Calvo (1980), Blanchard
(1983) and Zou (1997) and denes the representative agents utility function on foreign asset in
addition to consumption and real balances. The main results derived from our model are very
di¤erent from many existing studies such as Turnovsky (1985, 1987) and especially contrast
to the ones in Obstfeld (1981) paper: (1) foreign exchange intervation leads to more foreign
asset holdings and more consumption in the long run; (2) if the utility function is separable in
consumption and real balances as in Obstfeld (1981), ination has no e¤ect on the real variables
in both short run and long run; if the utility function is nonsaparable, ination results in more
consumption and foreign asset accumulation when the cross derivative of consumption and real
balances is positive; (3) government spending always reduces foreign asset accumulation and
crowds out private consumption, even in the case of the government services into the utility
function. Acctually, in the discussion on the stability of the dynamic system, we assume the
stability condition of the dynamic system named the relative smoothness condition for foreign
asset accumulation relative to consumption.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic framework of a simple model
of mercantilism. Section 3 discusses the dynamic system and stability. Section 4 makes detailed
comparative studies on the e¤ects of macroeconomic policies. And we conclude our paper in
Section 5.
4
2 A Model of Mercantilism
We consider a small open economy in a competitive world market. The economy is populated
with many identical people. We follow Bardhan (1967), Kurz (1968), Calvo (1980) and Blanchard
(1983) and dene a representative agents instanteneous utility function as
U(ct;mt; bt) = u(ct;mt) + w(bt);
where ct is consumption, mt is real money balance holdings, bt is the foreign asset holdings, and
 ( > 0) measures the mercantilist sentiments or wealth e¤ect. A negative bt is foreign debt,
and w(bt) is the disutility of debt as in Bardhan (1967) and Blanchard (1983); and for a positive
bt, w(bt) reects the wealth e¤ects introduced by Kurz (1968) or mercantilist sentiments by
Zou (1997). In order to advance our discussion, we impose the following assumptions on the
time preference rate and the utility function:
Assumption 1 :  > r: The constant time discount rate is strictly greater than the interest
rate of the foreign bonds.3
Assumption 2 : ui(ct;mt) > 0; uii(ct;mt) < 0; uij(ct;mt) < 0; i; j = ct;mt; i 6= j;
w0(bt) > 0; w00(bt) < 0; ucc(ct;mt)umm(ct;mt)  ucm(ct;mt)2 > 0:
The representative agent maximizes a discounted utility over an innite horizon:
Z 1
0
[u(ct;mt) + w(bt)]e
 tdt;
where  is the time discount rate and  2 (0; 1): The budget constraint is

at = y + rbt + xt   ct   tmt; (1)
at = bt +mt; (2)
and the initial asset is given by b(0): Where a dot over a variable is the time derivative, y is
,exogeneous and xed real output, xt is the real transfers from the government, at is the total
wealth of the representative agent, t is the expected ination rate and r is the returns on
foreign bonds, which is given in the world capital market. Expect for the utility function and
time discount rate, the setup of the model is identical to the one in Obstfeld (1981).
The home price of the goods is pt, and the corresponding world price is pt : Assuming pur-
chasing power parity, we have
3This is a necessary condition for the existence of a steady state. And this condition is also required for the
nite horizon model in Blanchard (1985). We will talk about this condition in the later discussion.
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pt = Etp

t ;
where Et is the exchange rate. With proper normalization, P t can be set to one. Then,
pt = Et:
The Hamiltonian function is4
H = u(c;m) + w(b) + (y + rb+ x  c  m) + (a  b m);
where  and  are the Hamilton multiplier and the Lagrange multiplier of the two budget
constraint respectively.
The necessary conditions for optimization are
uc(c;m)   = 0; (3)
um(c;m)      = 0; (4)
w0(b) + r   = 0; (5)
  +

 = 0; (6)
lim
t!1e
 tb = 0:
From (3), (4) and (5), we have
w0(b) + ruc(c;m) = um(c;m)  uc(c;m); (7)
which says that the marginal benet of holding foreign assets [w0(b)+ruc(c;m)] is equal to the
marginal benet of holding money [um(c;m)   uc(c;m)] at optimum. From (3), (5) and (6),
we get
w0(b) + (r   )uc(c;m) =  ucc(c;m) c  ucm(c;m) m: (8)
To fully spell out the dynamics, we need to specify the behavior of government. Government
revenue comes from money creation and interest earnings from the central banks reserves, i.e.,

M
p + rR; and R denotes the amount of foreign reserves. And government consumes goods, g,
and makes transfers, x, to the representative agent. Hence its budget constraint is given by
4We will leave out the time subscript in the following part of the paper.
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g + x =

M
p
+ rR: (9)
Let the money growth rate be a positive constant , namely,

M
M
= : (10)
From (10) and the denition of the real balances, i.e., m = Mp ; equation (9) can be writen as
x = m+ rR  g: (11)
On the perfect foresight path, the expected ination rate is equal to the actual ination rate:

p
p
=

E
E
= e = ; (12)
where e is expected rate of exchange rate depreciation. Therefore,

m = [

M
M
 

p
p
]m = (   )m: (13)
From (7), it is easy to say that  = um(c;m) w
0(b)
uc(c;m)
  r, which can be subsituted into (13).
Then,

m =
m[(r + )uc(c;m) + w
0(b)  um(c;m)]
uc(c;m)
: (14)
Subtituting (14) into (8) and substituting (2), (11) and (13) into (1) give

c =   1
ucc(c;m)

w0(b) + (r   )uc(c;m) +mumc
uc

(r + )uc + w
0(b)  um

: (15)

b = y + rb+ rR  c  g: (16)
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3 Dynamics and Stability
The global stability of the dynamic system formed by equations (14), (15) and (16) is hard to
examine. However, we can examine the local stability property of the system. Let

c =

m =

b = 0:
The steady state of the dynamic system, (c;m; b); is dened by
w0(b) + (r   )uc(c;m) = 0; (17)
(r + )uc(c
;m) + w0(b)  um(c;m) = 0; (18)
y + rb + rR  c   g = 0: (19)
It is easy to say that (17) and (18) can be transformed into
w0(b)
uc(c;m)
=   r; (20)
w0(b) + ruc(c;m) = um(c;m)  uc(c;m): (21)
Then, we can obtain the following proposition 0.
Proposition 0 If there exists a steady state, It must satisfy (20), (21) and assumption 1.
Furthermore, (20) tells that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption and foreign
assets is equal to a positive constant    r, and (21) tells that the marginal benet of
holding foreign assets is equal to the marginal benet of holding money in the equilibrium.
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It is easy to know the existence and uniqueness of steady state based on the assumption 1
and 2. To understand the stability of the system, we linearize (15), (14) and (16) around the
steady state, (c;m; b);
2664

c

m

b
3775 =
2664
  1uccA   1uccB   1uccC
m
uc
[(r + )ucc   umc] muc [(r + )ucm   umm] m

uc
w00(b)]
 1 0 r
3775
2664
c  c
m m
b  b
3775 ; (22)
where A = (r   )ucc + mumcuc [(r + )ucc   umc]; B = (r   )ucm + m
umc
uc
[(r + )ucm   umm];
5Equation (21) is the quilibrium version of the optimality condition (7), with  =  in the equilibrium.
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C = w00(b) + mw00(b)umcuc and the partial derivatives in the Jacobian matrix J of (22)
are evaluated in the steady state, (c;m; b): The trace of the J is
trace(J) =   m

ucucc
[uccumm   u2cm] > 0; (23)
which shows that there exists an engenvalue with a positive real part at least. And the determi-
nant of the J is det(J) =   muccuc

r(  r) uccumm   u2cm+ w00(b) [(+ )ucm   umm]	 : In
order to attain the saddle-point stability of the dynamic system, we need impose the condition
of det(J) < 0, which is equivalent to
  r

<
1
r
 w00(b)[(+ )ucm   umm]
uccumm   u2cm

: (24)
Because, if this condition is satised, the Jacobian matrix has a negative real eigenvalue or three
eigenvalues with negative real parts, and the second case is excluded by trace(J) > 0. Then a
negative real eigenvalue corresponding to the unique initial condition b(0) show that the dynamic
system is saddle-point stable. Then, we obtain the following stability theorem.
Theorem In the simple model of Mercantilism, if the assumptions 1, assumption 2 and condi-
tion (24) are satised, the existence, uniqueness and saddle-point stability of the steady
state of the dynamics system guarantee.
Furthermore, we can gain further economic insight about the stability condition (24), which
can be transformed into
 w00(b)n
(uccumm u2cm)
[(+)ucm umm]
o > r(  r): ( Relative Smoothness Condition) (25)
The lefe side of (25) is the relative concavity of the utility parts w(bt) and u(ct;mt). And
the stability condition tells that in order to guarantee the saddle-point stability of the dynamic
system, the relative concavity of the utility part of w(bt) to u(ct;mt) cannot be too small and
its lower bound is r(  r). Actually, it is easier to understand the economic insight underlying
in this condition in an economic environment with uncertainty. It is well known that the minus
second derivative or divided by the rst derivative measures the risk attitude of the agent, and
that consumers always smooth their consumption. Hence, it seems that consumers are likely
to smooth foreign asset holdings similar to the smoothness of consumption, furthermore, the
relative smoothness can not too small and its upper bound is r(  r). Therefore, we are likely
to name the stability condition as the relative smoothness condition for foreign asset holding.
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4 Policy Analysis
In this section, we investigate the Mercantilism model by the method of comparative static
analysis and study the e¤ects of the mercantilist mentality and all sorts of policies including
ination, government spending and foreign exchange intervention.
Totally di¤eretiating the three steady-state condition (17), (18) and (19), we have
2664
(r   )ucc (r   )ucm w00(b)
(r + )ucc   umc (r + )ucm   umm w00(b)
 1 0 r
3775
2664
dc
dm
db
3775 =
2664
 w0(b)d
 ucd   w0(b)d
dg   rdR
3775 (26)
4.1 The E¤ect of the Mercantilist Mentality
Let d = dg = dR = 0 in (26). Applying Cramers Rule, we obtain
dc
d
=
rw0(b)[umm   (+ )ucm]

> 0; (27)
dm
d
=
rw0(b)[(+ )ucc   umc]

> 0; (28)
db
d
=
 w0(b)[(+ )ucm   umm]

> 0; (29)
with  =  uccucm det(J) < 0 because of condition (24). Then, we obtain propostion 1.
Proposition 1 The stronger the mercantilist sentiment, the larger the long-run consumption,
real money balance holdings and foreign asset accumulation.
The reason for this proposition is quite clear. As a consumer highly values its wealth on
foreign assets, he (or she) saves more and consumes less in the short run in order to run a
current account surplus and accumulate more foreign assets. More foreign asset holdings means
more interest income, which in turn leads to more consumption in the long run. Proposition 1
is a very strong argument for mercantilism if consumers of a nation intends to maximize their
long-run consumption. And this proposition is similar to Proposition 1 in Zou (1997).
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4.2 The E¤ect of Ination
Let d = dg = dR = 0 in (26). Applying Cramers Rule, we obtain
dc
d
=
r(r   )ucucm

> 0; (30)
dm
d
=
r(  r)ucucc   w00(b)uc]

?0; (31)
db
d
=
(r   )ucucm

> 0: (32)
Proposition 2 Ination increases long-run consumption and foreign asset accumulation, while
its e¤ects on real money balances are ambiguous.
As the rate of monetary growth and the ination rate coincide in the long run, the increase
of the monetary growth rate (or ination) raises the opportunity cost of holding money in the
steadys state. Thus, consumers will economize on real balances and consume more in the new
long-run equilibrium. Thus, in order to nance for the more consumption, consumers must
accumulate more foreign assets and obtain more interest income. Therefore the positive e¤ects
on consumption and foreign asset accumulation can be found in the long run. As for real balance
holdings, there exist two opposite e¤ects. One the one hand, the increase of the opportunity
cost of holding money by monetary disturbance tends to decrease the demand for real money
balances; on the other hand, more consumption tends to increase the demand for real money
balances because more consumption will increase the marginal utility of real balances. Therefore,
the total e¤ects on the real money balance is ambiguous, and the sign of dm

d is undetermined.
But, if ucm = 0; the utility is saparable between consumption and real balance holdings, i.e.,
u(c;m) = u(c) + v(m), we can draw surprising conclusions. It is easy to show that the relative
smoothness condition (25) is simplied to
w00(b)
u00(c)
> r(  r); (33)
whose economic intuition is much clearer than (25) as though they are the same intrinsically.
From (30), (31) and (32), we have
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dc
d
= 0; (34)
dm
d
=
u0(c)
v00(m)
< 0; (35)
db
d
= 0; (36)
which surprisingly tells that the alteration of the rate of monetary growth has no e¤ect on the
long-run consumption and foreign asset holdings. Then we have derived a corollary.
Corollary If the utility is additively saparable between consumption and real money balance
holdings, money is super-neutrality in the sense of Sidrauski (1967), i.e., an increase of the
rate of monetary growth has no e¤ect on long-run consumption and foreign asset holdings.6
It is shown that money neutrality does come into existence in our simple model of mercan-
tilism. It is di¤erent from Obstfeld (1981), which derives the positive e¤ects on consumption
and foreign asset accumulation with saparable utility between consumption and real balances.
And the distinction between Obstfeld model and the mercantilism model depends upon the
assumption on the time preference rate.
It is useful to examine the reason underlying the distinction between the mercantilism model
with nonsaparable utility and the one with saparable utility. The underlying reason is that
the change of real balance holdings has no e¤ect on the marginal utility of consumption in
the saparable utility case, and hence has no e¤ects on the long-run consumption and foreign
asset holdings. Hence, the positive e¤ect of consumption on real money balance holdings does
not exist. Hence, the long run level of real balances does decrease, at the same time, money
superneutrality obtains. 7
4.3 The E¤ect of Foreign Exchange Intervention
Another interesting comparison between Obstfelds model and ours is the result of the central
banks foreign exchange intervation. In Obstfelds model, if the central bank intervenes in the
6 It is easy to nd that the comparative statics of other policy alterations in the saparable utility are the same
to the nonsaparable utility between consumption and real money balances.
7Comparing with Obstfeld (1981) paper which gives money non-superneutrality results with saparable and
Uzawas engogenous time preference, we nd that if we want to get the money non-superneutrality result, it is
necessary to introduce a mechnism of connecting consumption and real balance holdings into the welfare function
(or the objective funtion) of the representative consumer.
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foreign exchange market by purchasing foreign bonds from the public with domestic currency,
the total real asset in the economy is not a¤ected, and, as the central banks reserves also earn
real income and wealth remains the same. Therefore, the central banks intervention does not
have real e¤ects on foreign asset holdings, consumption and real balances. It only occasions a
rise in the price level exactly proportional to the increase in money supply. In our wealth-e¤ect
model, the budget constraint does not change as the interest rate income earned by the central
banks reverses is still redistributed to the public, but, as foreigh bonds are directly valued in
the utility function, the symmetry of foreign bonds and the central banks reserves in Obstfeldd
model disappears. Shortly after the intervention of the central bank, the reduction of foreign
bonds held by the private sector results in higher marginal utility of foreign asset, and the
optimality condition (7) and the quilibrium condition (21) no longer hold. In fact, when the
initial equilibrium foreign asset is reduced by dR and real balances are increased by dR, the
conditions (7) and (21) become
w0(b  dR) + (r + )uc(c;m+ dR)  um(c;m+ dR) > 0;
w0(b   dR) + (r + )uc(c;m + dR)  um(c;m + dR) > 0:
To restore equilibrium, the representative agent will increase consumption and buy more foreign
bonds in the short run. And in the new equilibrium, private consumption, real money balance
holdings and foreign asset holdings will reach a higher level.
Alternatively, let d = d = dg = 0 in (25) and Applying Cramers Rule, we can obtain
dc
dR
=
rw00(b)[(+ )ucm   umm]

> 0; (37)
dm
dR
=
rw00(b)[umc   (+ )ucc]

> 0; (38)
db
dR
=
r(  r)[uccumm   u2cm]

> 0: (39)
Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The central banks purchase of foreign claims from the public with domestic
currency will lead to more foreign asset accumulation (the sum of central banks reserve
and private holdings), more consumption and more real money balances.
4.4 The E¤ect of Government Expenditure
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Let d = d = dR = 0 in (26). And applying Cramers Rule, we obtain
dc
dg
=
w00(b)[umm   (+ )ucm]

< 0; (40)
dm
dg
=
w00(b)[(+ )ucc   ucm]

< 0; (41)
db
dg
=
(  r)[uccumm   u2cm]

< 0: (42)
It is assumed initially that government consumption is wasteful, in that it does not enter
into the agents utility function. Hence, government expenditures crowd out private consumption
and private asset accumulation. These conclusions are di¤erent from Obstfelds (1981) ridiculous
conclusions, which tell that the wasteful government expenditure have no e¤ects on the private
consumption and foreign asset holdings and positive e¤ects on foreign asset accumulation.
The preceding discussion has been based on the assumption that the level of government
spending does not enter into the utility function, as it would if government consumption resulted
in the provision of some public goods. In Obstfelds model with government expenditure into
the utility function, it tells that the alterations of government expenditure have nagative e¤ects
on real money balance holding while the e¤ects of this disturbance on private consumption
and foreign asset holdings are ambiguous. But in our mercantilism model, the introduction of
government expenditure into the utility function does not change the nagative e¤ects on all of
the three endogenous variables. To illustrate the strong results, we assume now that the utility
function has the form
U(c; g;m; b) = u(c; g) + v(m) + v(m); ug > 0; ucg > 0: (43)
According to (39), public and private consumption are complementary goods. After the same
calculation procedure similar to the former case,8 we obtain
dc
dg
=
 r(  r)v00(m)ucg(c; g) + w00(b)v00(m)

< 0;
dm
dg
=
(+ )w00(b)[ucc(c; g)  ucg(c; g)]

< 0;
db
dg
=
(  r)v00(m)[ucc(c; g)  ucg(c; g)]

< 0;
with  = r(  r)w00(b)ucc(c; g)  w00(b)v00(m) < 0. Therefore, we have Propositon 4.
8These calculations are in the appendix.
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Proposition 4 Government spending always reduces long-run consumption, real money bal-
ances and foreign asset holdings, even in the case that both public consumption and private
consumption do enter into the private utility function.
It seems that Proposition 3, especially Proposition 4 gives ridiculous results. As a matter of
fact, they nicely embody the essentials of the mercantilist sentiments: accumulation. Govern-
ment consumption is just like the private consumption which means the decrease of the wealth
and the decrease of asset accumulation. But the mercantilist spirits tell that we should focus on
accumulation not consumption in the short run, then we will obtain more long-run consumption
and wealth.
5 Conclusion
As an interesting economic theory with strong policy implications for the nations, mercantilism
retained her fascination in the academic and political environment. Past studies are literal de-
scription and formal mathematical model for mercantilism is seldom. In this paper, we formulate
a simple mathematical model of mercantilism and studies the e¤ects of macroecnomic policies
on foreign asset accumulation in a wealth e¤ect model used by Bardhan (1967), Kurz(1968),
Calvo (1980), Blanchard (1983) and Zou (1997).
The contributions of this paper can be summerized as follows. First of all, we formulate
a mercantilism model in the framework of open international macroeconomics and present a
theorem on the existence, uniqueness and stability of the steady state. It is shown that the
relative smoothness condition for foreign asset accumulation to consumption is a necessary
condition to guarantee the saddle-point stability of the steady state. Secondly, we execute the
full comparative statics of many macroeconomic policies and draw very interesting conclusions
di¤erent from the literature, especially from Obstfeld (1981). The results show that ination (or
an increase of the monetary growth rate) and foreign exchange intervention have positive e¤ects
on the long-run consumption and long-run foreign asset accumulation, government expenditure
disturbance has negative e¤ects on the long-run consumption, real money balance holdings and
foreign asset holdings and the nations with more mercantilist sentiments will have more long-run
consumption, real money balances and foreign assets. In particular, we have shown that money
is superneutrality when the private utility is saparable between consumption and real money
balance holdings. Comparing to the ridiculous results in Obstfeld (1981), we draw intuitional,
profound and interesting conclutions. At the same time, it is obvious that the di¤erence between
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the paper and the literature is from the model strateties. Acturally, it is clear that evaluating the
consequences of macroeconomic policies is complicated and the results are often very sensitive to
the optimization framework we have utilized. Our wealth e¤ect model only provides a di¤erent
perspective to the problems and it should be taken as complementary to many existing models.
The economic theory of mercantilism is abundant and complex. And the simple model in
the paper is just a try to grasp its spirits and much work should be done. In future research,
it is desirable to extent the endowment-economy and small-economy model in this paper into
a big-country model with both capital accumulation and foreign asset holdings. And we think
that such research extentions can include the more ideas of mercantilism and may be a way to
nd and solve the possible paradox in this theory.
Appendix
The corresponding Hamiltonian is
H = u(c; g) + v(m) + w(b) + (y + rb+ x  c  m) + (a  b m);
where  and  are Hamiltonian multiplier and Lagrangian multiplier of the two budget con-
straints. It is easy to derive the dynamic system with respect to (c;m; b) :

c =   1
ucc(c; g)
[w0(b) + (r   )uc(c; g)];

m =
m
uc(c; g)
[(r + )uc(c; g) + w
0(b)  v0(m)];

b = y + rb+ rR  c  g:
Linearizing the dynamic system around the steady state (c;m; b), we have
2664

c

m

b
3775 =
2664
  r 0   w00(b)ucc(c;g)
(r+)mucc(c;g)
uc(c;g)  
mv00(m)
uc(c;g)
mw00(b)
uc(c;g)
 1 0 r
3775
2664
c  c
m m
b  b
3775 :
Then the trace of the Jacobian matrix J are trace(J) =    mv00(m)uc(c;g) , which is positive.
And the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are det(J) =   r( r)mv00(m)uc(c;g) +
mw00(b)v00(m)
uc(c;g)ucc(c;g) .
In order to guarantee saddle-point stability, we must impose det(J) < 0, which is equivalent to
w00(b)
ucc(c;g) > r(  r). Hence, we obtain the relative smoothness condition
w00(b)
ucc(c; g)
> r(  r):
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The stationary values of consumption, real balances and foreigh assets are determined by
the equations:
w0(b) + (r   )uc(c; g) = 0;
(r + )uc(c
; g) + w0(b)  v0(m) = 0;
y + rb + rR  c   g = 0:
Totally di¤eretiating these equations and let d = dr = d = dR = dy = 0, we have
2664
(r   )ucc(c; g) 0 w00(b)
(r + )ucc(c
; g)  v00(m) w00(b)
 1 0 r
3775
2664
dc
dm
db
3775 =
2664
(  r)ucg(c; g)
 (r + )ucg(c; g)
1
3775 dg:
Dene the three dimension matrix of the matrix eqution as . Then, we have
 = r(  r)w00(b)ucc(c; g)  w00(b)v00(m) < 0:
Hence
dc
dg
=
 r(  r)v00(m)ucg(c; g) + w00(b)v00(m)

< 0;
dm
dg
=
(+ )w00(b)[ucc(c; g)  ucg(c; g)]

< 0;
db
dg
=
(  r)v00(m)[ucc(c; g)  ucg(c; g)]

< 0:
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